Conceptualizing the Gray Zone

Olof Petersson

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Summary
Gray zones in security policy need not be mental gray zones. Conceptualizing the gray zone is a prerequisite for a clear understanding of the security threats against the democratic society. A gray zone threat is defined as the use of non-military threats with antagonistic intentions. Gray zone threats exist in war as well as in peace. The Swedish case illustrates the challenges of organizing an efficient defense against gray zone threats in peacetime.

The concept of a "gray zone" is frequently used to describe a situation characterized by neither war nor peace. Also in Sweden the gray zone concept has become central in the discussion about the security situation and the vulnerabilities of the democratic system. Today it is taken for granted that contemporary threats are more and more complex. According to this prevailing view, the boundary between war and peace is blurred and this ambiguous situation is often labeled a "gray zone".[2]

The very expression "gray zone" in itself is confusing. "Gray zone" can have different meanings. Gray zone as a security threat indicates a specific combination of war and peace, or a mixture of military and non-military threats. But "gray zone" usually means that something is imprecise and vague. One dictionary defines gray zone as an "area of uncertainty or indeterminacy."[3] According to another dictionary, a gray zone implies that "it is unclear, for example because nobody is sure how to deal with it or who is responsible for it."[4]

This is the double problem of using "gray zone" to understand today's security threats. On the one hand, the security situation has deteriorated as an adversary is increasingly able to disturb and create harm by pursuing different kinds of gray zone operations. On the other hand, the ability to meet these security threats is hampered as the gray zone is considered diffuse and unclear.

The practical importance of conceptual clarification is obvious. Decision-makers might find themselves in situations calling for rapid choices. Either: "Yes, this is a gray zone threat, then we need to do this and this." Or: "No, this is not a gray zone threat, then we do not need to do anything." Simply put, navigating in fog requires exceptionally precise instruments.[5]

Concept formation

The gray zone concept does not differ from many other concepts in social science. Words can be ambiguous and contentious, but they can still be useful in situations that demand conceptual precision and rigor. What is necessary is that the word is defined according to established procedures of concept formation.

This means that it is important to separate between three analytical levels. Reality consists of different *phenomena*. A set of phenomena with certain common properties are delineated by a *concept*. The word used to label a concept is called a *term*.[6] In this case, the term is "gray zone".

Defining a concept can sometimes be difficult. For example, a concept can be defined too narrowly, which means that relevant phenomena are excluded from its definition. The opposite situation occurs when the definition is too broad, leading to irrelevant phenomena being included in it. Another problem concerns vagueness. A definition can be so diffuse and ambiguous that it is difficult to determine whether a certain phenomenon is covered by the definition or not. The gray zone concept suffers from all these problems.

Good concepts are characterized by criteria such as logic, clarity, and coherence. In fact, the list of such criteria can be made so long that it turns out to be difficult to meet all of them. Conceptual adequacy is an attempt to respond to several different demands, which often leads to trade-offs.[7]

The gray zone concept should also be defined in a way that makes it practically useful and compatible with current legislation. Particularly important is that a definition does not contradict constitutional principles and legal rules.

First attempt at defining gray zone: enumeration

One possible way of defining a concept is to list the phenomena seen as belonging together. The concept becomes their common denominator. In the growing literature on gray zone threats there are several, partly overlapping, lists. Some examples:

> Disinformation
> Destabilization
> Influence operations
> Manipulation of markets
> Diplomatic pressure
> Support for extremist movements
> Criminal activity
> Power demonstrations
> Illegal intelligence collection
> Threats and pressure on decision makers
> Lawfare
> Kompromat
> Cyberattacks
> Insurgencies
> Sabotage
> Infiltration

Enumeration is defining by making a list of objects. Enumerative definitions must fulfil certain requirements. Enumerations must be complete. This means that only relatively short lists of well-known phenomena are suitable for enumerative definitions. Otherwise, the extension of the concept might

be too narrow. New gray zone threats, or gray zones neglected in the enumeration, are likely to pass undetected. This is the first problem with using enumeration as the criterion for definition.

Furthermore, if an enumeration is viewed as a classification in the classical Aristotelian sense, the definition must meet special requirements. The categories should not only be complete but they should also be mutually exclusive. However, gray zone threats are different. These threats are often multidimensional and overlapping. This is why any attempt to fit gray zone threats into a conventional classification is a futile exercise. This is the second problem of enumeration.

The enumerative and classificatory strategy suffers from yet another problem. The question is what type of phenomena is defined. What is a "gray zone threat"? When it comes to threats such as sabotage, illegal intelligence operations and cyberattacks it is often evident that the source of the threat is an aggressive foreign state. In other cases, it is more difficult to judge the nature and the source of the threat. For instance, political influence operations, manipulation of markets, and criminal activities can also be initiated by other actors, foreign or domestic.

This is why it is difficult to build a definition of gray zone that only takes the action itself in account, without any reference to the intention behind the action. The opposite view has also been formulated: "This definition emphasizes the actual activities over intent".[8]

Some threats, such as manipulation of markets, influence operations, and support for extremist organizations can be, but do not have to be, gray zone threats. The crucial issue is whether there is an antagonistic intent behind a particular threat.[9] If so, it should be considered as a gray zone threat. If there is no antagonistic intent, the threat should not be seen as a gray zone threat. If this distinction is not upheld the definition of the gray zone would be too broad.

The different phenomena listed in the enumerations are certainly important social problems. However, if they have other sources than an antagonistic adversary they should not be considered as gray zone threats. This is the case even if national security is understood in a broad sense. According to official policy documents, Swedish security concerns the functionality and survival of society. The goals of Swedish security policy are to safeguard the ability to uphold fundamental values such as democracy, rule of law, and human rights and freedoms, to safeguard the life and health of the population, and to ensure the resilience of society.[10]

Thus, in order to determine whether an event poses a gray zone threat, one must always assess its intent. The harm inflicted on society may be the same but the intent is crucial for the response. This task is more difficult than merely characterizing events. Assessing the intent behind an event requires analytical skill based on education, experience, research and training.

The question is whether the source of the threat is an antagonistic adversary. A communication tower crashes to the ground: antagonistic intent or not? A prime minister is assassinated when walking home from the cinema: antagonistic intent or not? An airplane crashes into a skyscraper: antagonistic intent or not? A senior decision maker is offered bribes: antagonistic intent or not?

Second attempt at defining gray zone: a zone between peace and war
There is a broad consensus that gray zone threats to national security do not fit into the binary conception of either peace or war. It might, therefore, seem natural to conceptualize these kinds of threats as a zone "between" peace and war. One study discusses the present security situation "below the threshold
of armed conflict, in what is sometimes termed the *gray zone* between

peace and war."[11] It is not difficult to find other examples of this kind of definition.[12]

To understand this definition one has to imagine a world without a gray zone. In this theoretical case, there are only two categories: peace and war. Although an exact definition of war is not to be found in international law, security policy or in academic research there is nevertheless a broad agreement that the distinction between war and peace must take into account both intentions and means. War can be defined as a situation where the relationship between two state actors is characterized by antagonistic intentions and the use of military means. Peace is then, inversely, defined as non-antagonistic intentions and non-military threats. Figure 1 illustrates this theoretical model with only two zones: peace and war.

**Figure 1
Two zones**

Peace	**War**

Non-antagonistic intent ▭▭▭▭ ▬▬▬▬ Antagonistic intent
Non-military threat ▭▭▭▭ ▬▬▬▬ Military threat

While this simple model does not say anything about a gray zone, it can serve as a starting point for a definition. Obviously, a gray zone is neither peace nor war. A *gray zone* is defined as *the use of non-military threats with antagonistic intentions.*[13]

One of several possible ways to illustrate this definition is to consider the gray zone as a category between peace and war. Figure 2 illustrates this line of thinking, which is obviously the basis for many definitions found in the literature.

Figure 2
Three zones

| Peace | Gray zone | War |

Non-antagonistic intent ▭▬▬▬▬ Antagonistic intent
Non-military threat ▭▬▬▬▬ Military threat

It is also possible to illustrate this definition as a staircase. Figure 3 demonstrates that the gray zone can be viewed as a step in a chain of events leading from peace to war.

Figure 3
Three zones as a staircase

War
Gray zone
Peace

Non-antagonistic intent ▭▬▬▬▬ Antagonistic intent
Non-military threat ▭▬▬▬▬ Military threat

From a logical point of view, it does not matter whether the three zones are placed next to each other or arranged as a staircase. These are simply different presentation techniques. However, regardless of how the three zones are illustrated, it is problematic to imagine a gray zone situated "between" peace and war. There are three problems with this particular conceptualization.

The first problem: non-military threats are also used in war
Defining gray zone as a state between peace and war implies there is no gray zone in war. Such an interpretation is obviously false. Most, if not all, of the threats that usually exemplify the gray zone problem can appear in war.

Non-military threats such as political pressure, hostile propaganda, diplomatic threats, economic sanctions, trade wars, capture of strategic infrastructure, support for extremist movements, psychological display of power, scare tactics, disinformation, propaganda, cyberattacks, and other

similar threats can easily be combined with military operations. In fact, it could be argued that all wars include elements of gray zone activities.[14]

The second problem: this conception might lead to a legal gray zone
The three-zone model with the gray zone positioned as a separate area between peace and war can lead to legal uncertainty. Constitutional principles and legal regulation in Sweden, as in many other countries, are built on the assumption that there are only two situations: either peace or war.

In Sweden there are special rules for a wartime situation if the political process cannot function according to normal procedures. Constitutional powers could then be transferred from the legislature to the executive. Sweden has decided to create constitutional rules in peacetime which, as far as possible, enable public bodies to act with constitutionally defined powers even in situations of war. The idea is to avoid constitutional uncertainty. This is a question of democratic legitimacy. A legal gray zone means that political and administrative decisions can be questioned on juridical grounds. This means that there is a risk that decisions taken in order to defend the country will not be respected as legitimate. Such loss of authoritative legitimacy might make it easier for an intruder or treasonous groups to seize power.

The Swedish Constitution contains a special chapter on war and the danger of war.[15] The decision to declare that the country is in war is taken by the Government under constitutional responsibility. According to the Act on Total Defense and Heightened State of Alert, total defense means activities needed to protect Sweden in a situation of war.[16] Under the highest state of alert, total defense is mobilized. Total defense consists of military defense and civilian defense. A comprehensive regulatory framework exists for how Swedish society is to function during war or during a heightened state of alert. Total defense activities cover virtually all the sectors of Swedish society.

The three-zone model with a gray zone placed in between peace and war is not compatible with the constitutional two-zone model. One observer notes: "In the Swedish defense policy debate, the concept of 'gray zone' has been discussed in terms of a no-man's land between war and peace". In modern warfare, there are no clear boundaries between war and peace. Thus "the legal gray zone in which many of today's conflicts take place creates practical problems for the actors protecting Sweden's territorial integrity and sovereignty".[17]

This situation is unsatisfactory in several respects. The very idea of "legal no man's land" and "legal gray zone" is in conflict with the rule of law and the principle of legal predictability. Furthermore, such a legal uncertainty can also lead to great practical difficulties. It becomes an open question what can be done and what should be done. In the case of legal uncertainty decision-makers can make widely differing interpretations. The consequences could be delay, hesitation, overreaction or uncoordinated action.

The third problem: gray zone threats can mean reduced as well as increased risk of war

When the gray zone is placed as an intermediate stage between peace and war, it is explicitly or implicitly implied that gray zone threats constitute a step towards war. The gray zone threats might be difficult to interpret but the underlying assumption remains: more gray zone threats automatically increases the risk of war.

But this model of thinking does not cover all aspects of the gray zone threat. The problem can be even more severe. Gray zone activities, that is, antagonistic intentions with non-military means, do not necessarily have to be connected to military operations. Gray zone activities can also be alternatives to military action. This means that the risk of war can decrease as the gray zone threat increases. An extreme scenario would be that gray zone threats are replacing the danger of military war.

9

Already during the Cold War, American strategists reasoned along these lines. George Kennan coined the term "political war" in contrast to "military war". Now, the term is not entirely successful since a military war, as Carl von Clausewitz once pointed out, is a continuation of politics. But the basic argument still holds. Political influence strategies can play a partially independent role, regardless of their connection to military power. Kennan referred to a wide range of activities other than purely military: "measures short of war".[18] A similar distinction separates "soft war" from strictly military "hard war".[19]

The idea of political warfare, in contrast to military warfare, is also used in interpretations of contemporary Russian strategy. Disinformation, propaganda, diplomatic threats, economic blackmail, subversion, cyberattacks, and covert actions are included in the Russian arsenal of antagonistic, non-military means. Russia's geopolitical ambitions are implemented by "operations short of all-out warfare".[20]

In sum, there are severe problems associated with the three-zone model, which situates the gray zone as an intermediate stage between peace and war. This criticism does not mean that the three-zone model is wrong, only that it is insufficient.

Third attempt at defining gray zone: a gray zone in both peace and war
A gray zone can still be defined as the use of the use of non-military threats with antagonistic intentions. In strictly logical terms, there are four possible combinations, that take into account two types of means (military and non-military) and two types of intentions (antagonistic and non-antagonistic). One of the combinations, the use of military means with non-antagonistic intentions (such as peacekeeping operations and military support in case of natural disasters), can be left out in a discussion about threats to national security.

The question is whether it is possible to conceptualize the gray zone in a way that avoids the problems associated with the definitions mentioned so far. Obviously, an enumerative definition is not viable. Gray zone activities are not only found in an intermediate situation but also in war. A conceptualization should not lead to legal gray zones. Gray zone activities can be complementary but also alternatives to military operations.

The only way forward is to develop a model with four different zones. The model in Figure 4 acknowledges that there can be gray zone threats also in situations other than in war and in the immediate danger of war.

Figure 4
Four zones

	Peace	War
	Gray zone in peace Antagonistic intent Non-military threat	Gray zone in war Antagonistic intent Non-military threat
	White zone Non-antagonistic intent Non-military threat Crisis and emergency	Black zone Antagonistic intent Military threat Armed conflict

White zone: non-antagonistic threats in peacetime
What can be called "white zone" threats are characterized by a non-antagonistic nature that have a non-military character. Certainly, a peaceful, democratic society contains conflicts, risks, disasters, crime and crises. However, many of these threats have causes other than antagonistic intentions from malign adversaries.[21] These non-antagonistic threats fall outside the concept of gray zone.

Gray zone in peacetime: political warfare

Gray zone threats exist also in peacetime. In this case, gray zone is still defined as the use of non-military means with antagonistic intentions. The difference is that the link to military operations is lacking. Peacetime refers to a situation in which the Government has not used its prerogative to declare that the country is in war or in the danger of war. In peacetime the regulations on total defense and heightened state of alert are not in force.

It should be noted that a "gray" zone is as precisely defined as a "white" and a "black". Gray means a particular combination of black and white. A gray zone is defined as antagonistic intentions by means of non-military operations. To conclude: a gray zone threat does not have to be a conceptual gray zone or a legal gray zone.

Black zone: military war
War is understood as the combination of antagonistic intentions and military means. In this context, the question how to define "military" can be left open. In some situations, it might be relevant to include, for example, non-state actors and irregular armed forces.

Gray zone in war
Much of the discussion about the gray zone threat centers on war or the danger of war. In a war, the enemy can be expected to use a wide range of non-military methods, such as psychological warfare, cyberattacks, deception, and attempts to destroy infrastructure. In a war situation, a gray zone can also arise when the adversary is made up non-governmental actors.

Hybrid warfare
A realistic assessment of the risk of war must be based on the combined threat of military and non-military operations. Defense planning must therefore take into account the black zone as well as the gray zone in war. The term *hybrid warfare* can be used to distinguish this particular combination of military threats and non-military threats.

However, the terms "hybrid warfare" and "hybrid threats" appear to be just as ambiguous and contested as "gray zone".[22] Sometimes "hybrid threats" are viewed as synonymous with "gray zone threats", sometimes not.[23] According to the standard definition, the word "hybrid" means a mixture of two different things. This is why it seems natural to define hybrid threats as a combination of military and non-military threats.

Hybrid threats do not form a distinct category. Rather, this concept should be seen as an umbrella concept covering a broad spectrum of different types of threats. Sometimes threats are primarily military with non-military gray zone activities playing a secondary role. Sometimes gray zone threats dominate. This is why hybrid threats can be ordered along a "continuum of conflict".[24]

**Figure 5
Hybrid threats**

The term "hybrid threats" implies a combination of military and non-military threats. Using "hybrid threats" to denote exclusively non-military threats, which is as a synonym for gray zone, is tautological and potentially misleading.

Four separate zones – four types of threats

This discussion leads to the conclusion that it is necessary to separate between four types of threat, four different "zones".

The black zone represents armed conflict and military attacks. *The gray zone in war* stands for the non-military threats that accompany military operations. The combination of these two zones can be called hybrid threats. In Sweden, the legal conditions for hybrid war are determined by the Constitution's chapter on war and the danger of war. The Constitution empowers the Government to initiate the emergency measures covered by Act on Total Defense and Heightened State of Alert.

The other two zones relate to peacetime conditions. *The gray zone in peacetime* covers antagonistic, non-military threats in a situation where the country is not at war. *The white zone* represents non-antagonistic threats, such as catastrophes, natural disasters, and other serious social crises in situations where the Government has not declared that the country is at war.[25]

The intentions of the gray zone

The purpose of gray zone activities is ultimately to inflict harm on the adversary. Since Sweden is a democracy, the antagonistic intentions of the gray zone, in addition to other ways of harming society, focus on weakening and disrupting the democratic decision-making process. This threat is a reality not only in situations of war and danger of war, but also in peacetime.

One intention of gray zone activities may be to divide and rule.[26] Troll factories, fake news, and support for extremist movements are elements of such attempts to polarize society and sow dissension. Similar divisive tactics can also be applied to intergovernmental relations. For instance, raising nationalist sentiments in Europe makes it more difficult for EU to act as a unified and strong actor in foreign policy.

Another intention may be to distract. By subverting the agenda for public debate and political decision-making, an enemy can divert attention away

from its own actions. Moreover, gray zone threats can include terrorism with the aim to instill fear in the population. Common to all variants of gray zone threats are attempts by an enemy to influence the political decision-making process in order to force concessions in favor its own purposes.

The defense against gray zone threats

Conceptualizing the gray zone in this way means that the discussion must be widened, not narrowed. All combinations of threats require heightened awareness in society. In Sweden, the renewed defense policy will allocate more resources to military defense. Increased attention is also paid to the threat of hybrid warfare, which is the combination of military and different types of non-military threats.[27] Additionally, increased attention must also be paid to gray zone threats in peacetime. Antagonistic, non-military operations already affect Swedish society and the democratic process. All indicators point to an increased importance of gray zone threats in the future.

Several explanations can be given for the growth of gray zone threats in peacetime. The most important one is the vulnerability of society. The open society of democracy with free citizens, independent media, and a civil society is always more susceptible to attacks and manipulation than closed societies based on tight state control. Vulnerability is increasing with growing dependence on digital communication, sensitive electronics, continuous trade flows, cash-free transactions and complex globalized networks. Why would an antagonistic state mobilize a costly and clumsy military force when it can bring about the same harm from a computer at a desk in its own capital?

It can be debated if Sweden is sufficiently well prepared to detect and counteract the wide spectrum of gray zone threats.[28] Many actors are involved, public and private, and the distribution of roles and responsibilities is far from clear. The uncertainty expressed in formulations such as "legal

gray zone" and "legal twilight zone" indicate the need to revise legislation and governmental regulation.

It is beyond the scope of this report to explore how an efficient defense against gray zone threats should be organized. However, it seems obvious that three main alternatives are conceivable.

The first option is to keep the current regulation but extend its application. It is the Government that decides to declare a heightened state of alert. According to the criteria currently applied, the country must face an immediate threat of armed attack. Most gray zone threats in peacetime would not be covered by these strict criteria. One possibility is for the Government to extend the interpretation of "war and the danger of war" to take into account the changing character of war[29].

Another option is to maintain the narrow interpretation of war and danger of war but introduce a civil equivalent to the current emergency legislation for military attacks. A parliamentary commission on constitutional reform in 2008 showed how such a clause could be added to the Constitution. However, this proposal never led to any political decision. According to this proposal the Government in the event of civil crises and emergencies could temporarily be given far-reaching powers.[30] The Constitution's chapter "War and danger war" could be extended to "War, danger of war, and emergencies".[31]

The third option, probably the worst, is to do nothing at all, with the consequence that defense capabilities could be hampered by uncertainties in terms of command, roles and responsibilities. So far, the Constitution has been designed to avoid *jus necessitatis*, when the Government defines on its own what is "necessary" action.[32] Sweden has chosen to be well-prepared by introducing rules already in peacetime that, as far as possible,

create a clear legal basis for action also in times of war. The status quo option, which leads to increasing gaps in the legislation, would effectively erode this sound principle.

The administrative structure of contemporary Sweden differs from the state bureaucracy during the Cold War. At that time there was a dual structure with special authorities that would only come into operation in wartime. This dual structure has been replaced by another administrative model. Today, the same public agency is responsible in peace as well as in war. The current model for crisis management is based on three principles: the principle of responsibility, the principle of equality and the principle of closeness. Compared to the Cold War organization, the present principle of responsibility is better suited to meet future scenarios, where the same gray zone threats can appear both in peace and war.

The difference between the two organizational models can be illustrated by psychological defense. In 1954, two different agencies were established: one for peace and one for war. In the new organization which is currently being planned, one single authority will be responsible in peace as well as war.[33]

Yet no matter how well the state is organized, no government alone can defend Swedish society against gray zone threats. Ultimately, it is a question of how democracy can organize its self-defense within the framework of the democratic system based on the rule of law.[34] All of society must be mobilized for democratic self-defense. It is difficult to imagine any social activity now or in the near future that will not have to prepare itself against the antagonistic threats of the gray zone. Therefore, it is crucial that the concept of gray zone is clearly understood.

[1] Olof Petersson is a political scientist, formerly professor at Uppsala University, Sweden. The author wants to thank Anna Djup, Lars Hedström, Ingvar Hellquist, Johan Hirschfeldt, Magnus Hjort, Johanna Laurin, Rutger Lindahl, Michele Micheletti, Fredrik Sterzel, Bengt Sundelius, Björn von Sydow and Per Thunholm for valuable comments.

[2] E.g. The Swedish Defence Research Agency 2018. https://www.foi.se/nyheter-och-press/nyheter/2018-02-01-nytt-typfall-om-grazon-till-totalforsvarsplaneringen.html.

[3] https://www.thefreedictionary.com/Gray+Zone

[4] https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/gray-area

[5] In other words, an ontological gray zone does not necessarily have to be an epistemological gray zone.

[6] Hempel 1970, Sartori 1970, 1984.

[7] Gerring 1999.

[8] Hoffman 2018.

[9] Antagonistic threats can be described as hostile and aggressive. A distinction is made in relation to all the non-antagonistic conflicts that characterize social life and international relations. In a democratic and peaceful context non-antagonistic conflicts are managed by procedures and institutions such as negotiations, diplomacy, markets, and majority decisions. Antagonistic threats are intended to defeat or harm the adversary, either through war or by alternative means.

[10] Ds 2006:1. Report from The Swedish Defense Commission.

[11] Morris et. al. 2019, p. iii. Italics in the original.

[12] Some Swedish examples: FOI 2018a, FOI 2019a, Säkerhetspolisens årsbok 2018, FHS 2019, FOI 2019b, Palmgren 2017.

[13] Conceptualizing the gray zone in this way presumes that a distinction can be made between military and non-military operations. In practical and legal situations, it is often necessary to determine exactly how to separate military from non-military action. However, in a general discussion of concept formation it is not crucial how this line is drawn. Here the general meaning of "non-military" is here understood in the same sense as modern concepts such as "non-linear", "non-traditional" and "non-kinetic".

[14] Käihkö 2016.

[15] The Instrument of Government, Chaper 15. https://riksdagen.se/en/how-the-riksdag-works/democracy/the-constitution. Cf. Eka m fl 2018, p. 693. Se SOU 2008:61 och SOU 2008:125.

[16] Lag om totalförsvar och höjd beredskap (SFS 1992:1403).

[17] FOI 2018b.

[18] Kennan 1948. Se även Jones 2018.

[19] Gross & Meisels 2017. This in turn relates to the concept of "soft power" (Nye 1990, 2017). Sweden is often ranked high when countries are rated on scales of soft power, see for example softpower30.com.

[20] Galeotti 2019.

[21] On antagonistic threats, see e.g. Regeringskansliet 2017 och Häggström & Brun 2019.

[22] E.g. Hoffman 2009a, Hoffman 2009b, Nicander & Arnevall 2015, Lalu & Puistola 2015, Chambers 2016, Reichborn-Kjennerud & Cullen 2016, EU 2016, Cullen & Reichborn-Kjennerud 2017 och Weissman 2019.

[23] A distinction between hybrid threats and gray zone threats is made by Carment & Belo 2018.

[24] Hoffman 2018.

[25] A terminological caveat should be added. The words white, gray and black are used here to denote different types of threat. However, the words white, gray and black are also employed in psychological defense. It is common to separate between white propaganda (with openly identified sources), gray propaganda (with unclear sources) and black propaganda (with disguised or false sources). The same terms are used for different phenomena, which can always be treacherous. Gray zone threats can certainly consist of gray propaganda, but also of white and black propaganda.

[26] Wigell 2019a.

[27] Ds 2017:66, Ds 2019:8.

[28] Sundelius 2016.

[29] On the changing character of war, see Strachan & Scheipers (2011), Hoffman (2019).

[30] The Constitutional Commission proposed a definition of a civil crisis: "En nödsituation som innebär omfattande skador eller en överhängande risk för sådana skador på människor, egendom eller miljö eller innebär en allvarlig störning eller en överhängande risk för en sådan störning i centrala samhällsfunktioner." (An emergency situation involving extensive damage or an imminent risk of such damage to people, property or the environment or poses a serious disturbance or an imminent risk of such a disturbance of vital functions of society.) SOU 2008:61, p. 64.

[31] SOU 2008:125, p. 527. Hirschfeldt 2018, p. 172.

[32] SOU 2008:125, o. 503.

[33] Tubin 2003, dir. 2018:80.

[34] Concepts such as "wehrhafte Demokratie", "self-defending democracy", "streitbare Demokratie", and "militant democracy" are discussed by Kelsen 2006, Thiel 2003, and Müller 2017, Wigell 2019b. Se also Petersson 2014, 2015, 2018.